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Abstract 
Commentators like Goldacre, Dawkins, and Singh and Ernst are worried that the rise in 
complementary and alternative medicine (CAM) represents a flight from science propagated by 
enemies of reason. We outline what kind of problem CAM use is for these commentators and 
find that users of CAM are constituted as duped, ignorant, irrational, or immoral to explain CAM 
use. However, this form of problematization can be described as a flight from social science. We 
explore CAM use in light of the rigorous and robust social scientific body of knowledge. By 
pointing to the push and pull factors, CAM user’s experiences of their body, and the problem of 
patient choice in CAM use, we summarize some of the key findings made by social scientists and 
show how they trouble many of the reasoned assumptions about CAM use.  
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People who choose to see alternative therapists make that choice with their eyes open, or 
at least only half closed. (Goldacre, 2008, p. 318) 
 
In an otherwise contentious field commonly referred to as complementary and alternative 
medicine (CAM) in Western societies there seems to be some kind of consensus around one thing: 
The past few decades have been marked by a growing interest in, and a revival of CAM (Cant & 
Sharma, 1999; World Health Organization, 2002). More recently very public controversies and 
debates have been concerned with questions about how to respond to such trends. In popular 
media reporting around CAM, we distinguish between three points of view. First, there are 
advocates who actively encourage and laud the revival often as an antidote to a toxic biomedicine. 
Second, there are pragmatists who argue that if use and availability of CAM is increasing, then 
appropriate regulatory measures must be taken to ensure that its products are safe and its 
practitioners responsible and ethical. Finally, there are opponents who are deeply concerned, 
worried that a rise in CAM is putting patient safety at risk as unknowing and ignorant consumers 
are being duped into buying snake oils and miracle cures by “enemies of reason” (Dawkins, 
2007a). 
We engage this latter group of vocal commentators in this article. We begin by outlining 
what kind of problem CAM use is today for this group of concerned commentators.1 We ask, 
how has growing interest in and use of CAM2 by the public come to be cast as a problem? In 
answering this we show how characterizations of CAM users as duped, irrational, ignorant, or 
immoral are inaccurate and unhelpful if we are to understand CAM use.  
We argue that the problematization of CAM by this group of commentators might itself 
be described as a flight from science; albeit not the science of randomized placebo controlled 
trials, meta-analyses and preclinical mechanism-of-action studies that are usually advocated. For 
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it does seem somewhat peculiar to account for the health care practices, choices and preferences 
of individuals without paying particular empirical attention to the social context in which 
individuals take care of their health. In the last few decades, a rigorous and robust social 
scientific body of knowledge around exactly these kinds of questions has emerged around the 
field of CAM. In the second part of this article we summarize some of the key findings of this 
work as a way to trouble the above mentioned characterizations of CAM users. 
In the conclusion we argue that it would be better for all if the different scientific worlds 
engaged in more dialogue. If clinical science can answer questions about which specific effects 
are attributable to a particular therapy, and biological science can answer questions about the 
cellular and molecular pathways of diseases and treatments, then social science can answer 
questions about the ways social factors affect how and why certain forms of health care are 
practiced and used. Addressing questions of CAM use is therefore a useful arena in which to 
observe each of these forms of science in action, and if we are to account for a rise in CAM use 
and availability, we will do well to bring all forms of knowledge into the analysis. 
CAM subjects – duped, ignorant, irrational, or immoral 
It has become fashionable (and politically correct) to ask patients to present their views. 
In CAM meetings, this usually entails a patient telling the audience how marvelous her (it 
usually is a woman) Reiki healer, aromatherapist etc, has been compared to her ghastly 
experience with mainstream medicine. These lectures are usually loaded with emotion and 
devoid of anything remotely resembling data, evidence or rational thought. (Ernst, 2011) 
 
In this section we consider some of the arguments and understandings of CAM use by a 
particular group of critics. Trained in natural or biomedical sciences, they are very vocal 
commentators, publishing and broadcasting in newspapers and television stations in the United 
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Kingdom, United States and elsewhere. Focusing on their arguments allowed us to identify the 
different ways in which CAM use has been characterized in recent years and how it has come to 
be identified as problematic.3 Their explorations mostly take their point of departure in 
discussions about the safety and efficacy of treatments, whether by focusing on one or a small 
number of popular treatments, such as homeopathy and acupuncture, or through a consideration 
of CAM in general. Although not necessarily a central question for them, their arguments often 
included assertions (both explicit and implicit) about the people who use CAM. What emerged 
from an analysis of their arguments is a characterization of users of CAM as duped, ignorant, 
irrational or immoral. 
Duped 
One of the most well-known opponents of CAM is Richard Dawkins (2007a), who has outlined 
the problem in the starkest of terms: “Today, while we indulge unproven healing magic, tried and 
tested scientific medicine is under attack. . . . Health has become a battleground between reason 
and superstition” (Enemies of Reason: episode one). Dawkins argued: 
Alternative health remedies are swamping us. Most are not properly tested; they 
undermine science and delude the public. . . . Resuscitating [ancient forms of medicine] 
today is rather like bringing back bleeding with leeches. . . . developed before we 
understood the causes of disease, before germ theory, it was based on ignorance then, and 
age makes it no truer. We misguidedly look back to a Golden Age that never was. 
(Enemies of Reason: episode two; Dawkins, 2007b) 
 
Dawkins is joined by Michael Baum and Edzard Ernst (2009) in his condemnation: “By 
opening the door to irrational medicine alongside evidence based medicine, we are poisoning the 
minds of the public” (p. 973). 
  6
The narrative is of the user being deceived by the pseudo knowledge of the CAM 
advocate. Over the years, analogies have changed from CAM users being duped into its esoteric 
ways, like the innocent housewife faced with the charming snake oil salesman, to today where 
customers are duped by multimillion pound industry with its slick advertising (Diamond, 2001; 
Goldacre, 2008). Nevertheless, this is no one way street. It would seem there is a battle going on 
for the health of the public, one where the user needs to be educated about the power of scientific 
knowledge. 
Ignorant 
One of the key arguments for those defending reason is the Public Understanding of Science 
(PUS) position, or rather, the notion that it is the public’s failure to understand science which 
leads them to use CAM. The argument goes something like this: If people only understood the 
power of the scientific method and learnt how to think scientifically, they would come to 
appreciate all that science has given them and come to view sham or pseudoscience with the 
disdain it deserves. Consequently, the task of the expert is to educate the public to correct any 
mistaken beliefs. Two recent books – Trick or Treatment? by Singh and Ernst (2009) and Bad 
Science by Goldacre (2008) – reflect this tactic. Singh and Ernst have a whole chapter explaining 
the scientific method and Goldacre’s book is similarly a pedagogic exercise in applying this idea: 
“by the end of this book you’ll have the tools to win – or at least understand – any argument you 
choose to initiate” (p. xii). However, for those users who fail to accept the truths derived from 
scientific rationalism there is still a need to articulate why they continue to use CAM. 
Irrational 
In the opening pages of his book, Goldacre (2008) argued: “You cannot reason people out of 
positions they did not reason themselves into” (p. xii). This is a sentiment that is shared by 
Fitzpatrick (2002) who suggested: “Though numerous trials have already revealed that such 
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treatments do not work, these results are simply denied or ignored: faith in alternatives cannot be 
challenged by such methods. These researches lead only to the demand for more researches”. 
Similarly Ernst (2006) said: 
Almost everyone seems to be an ‘expert’ in CAM. . . . A more appropriate name for this 
phenomenon is probably ‘pseudoexperts’. It helps, I think, not to be too intelligent. This 
makes it easier for the pseudoexpert to fall victim to his or her own powers of persuasion. 
The result is often an almost religious belief of the pseudoexpert in the correctness of his 
or her assertions. (p.85) 
 
In yet another vocal critique of CAM, Michael Baum (2009) has lamented that much of 
the use of CAM can be laid at the door of postmodern relativism – the idea that all opinions and 
knowledge have equal values. Coupled with this, he stated, is a distrust of authority and scientists, 
as much as in the science itself. Faith, religion, unreasoned positions and postmodern relativism, 
each represent a version of irrationality on the part of CAM user. 
Immoral 
The critiques of CAM use also raise questions about CAM framed as a moral problem. Again, 
Dawkins summarized this neatly saying, “As a scientist I do not think that our indulgence of 
irrational superstition is harmless, I believe that it profoundly undermines our civilization” 
(Dawkins, 2007b). Although Goldacre (2008) largely aimed his moralizing at CAM practitioners, 
as we can see in this article’s epigraph, he also asserted the culpability of the user in these 
unscientific ways of life. Goldacre’s criticism of CAM was not just that it provided placebo 
treatments, but that it provided placebo explanations or placebo diagnosis. He questioned the 
benefits of this combination, even allowing for the physical benefits that it provided the patient, 
“assertively and authoritatively giving someone access to the sick role can also reinforce 
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destructive illness beliefs and behaviors, unnecessarily medicalize symptoms. . . . and militate 
against people getting on with life and getting better” (p.75). 
Summing up 
We have outlined how a vocal group of commentators on CAM efficacy have included in their 
critiques a problematization of CAM users. They start by asserting the unproblematic nature of 
the evidence against (most) CAMs. The user is then depicted as someone who once was (half) 
blind but now because of the revelation of scientific method and knowledge, can see. However 
the problem of CAM use somehow persists, and has led to ever more determined attempts to 
implore the user to come to her senses, while blaming her for the continued resilience of CAM. 
In concluding this section we would like to make it clear that although we have briefly 
summarized characterizations of CAM users under four simplistic headings, we do not wish to 
create a straw argument here. The above analysis is not a rejection of discussions concerning the 
efficacy of CAM. Although there are limitations to such efficacy discussions (e.g. Barry, 2006; 
Broom & Tovey, 2007), we do not wish to distract from some of the important findings the above 
authors have highlighted, such as pointing to the dangers of using CAM in preference to 
established biomedical treatments.  
We also acknowledge that these commentators have recognized and attempted to engage 
the psychological, social, cultural, political, economic and even spiritual components of health 
care and CAM use. For example, Singh and Ernst (2009) concluded, “Alternative medicine is not 
so much about the treatments we discuss in this book, but about the therapeutic relationship” 
(p.326). Baum (2009) suggested, “Before health service providers even think about the role of 
medicine, they must consider patients’ requirement for moral and spiritual support” (p.409). 
Goldacre (2008) underlined the importance of culture in discussions of health care suggesting 
that many CAM practices are “better understood as a cultural product” (p.10). 
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Given the background and central aims of these commentators it is no surprise that their 
analytical focus is on the evidence from randomized controlled trials (RCTs). However, as they 
acknowledge, “it is a little more complicated than that” (with thanks to Goldacre). The 
conclusion that seems so obvious (to us as social scientists, at least) from analyzing their books 
and articles is that the problem of CAM use is not a problem of scientific evidence and clinical 
efficacy (unlike the problem of does CAM work? (Wahlberg, 2008)).  It is a social and cultural 
problem; a problem that has more to do with how we know ourselves as bodies, citizens, and 
consumers in the world. The authors above have led many public debates on CAM, but appear 
not to be equipped conceptually, as much as empirically, to handle the conclusions they come to. 
If CAM use is a social and cultural problem, it seems remarkable that significant social science 
research into such problems are systematically overlooked if not explicitly shunned. As Ernst and 
Chatwin (2005) noted in their debate, the value of social science is easily downplayed: 
Focus groups, interviews, text analysis and similar techniques are almost a caricature of 
sociology. Usually such qualitative methods are helpful for formulating but useless for 
testing hypotheses. . . . the results of such research can rarely be generalised. If results 
cannot be generalised, what exactly are their value? (p.16) 
 
How then might we address this apparent flight from social science in mainstream debates 
concerning CAM use? To begin with, it is one of our tasks as qualitative health researchers to 
explain and stand by the value of our research findings. With this in mind, we now turn our 
attention to the social science of CAM use. 
What social scientists have found out about CAM use 
We consider here some of the evidence that can help explain how CAM has become culturally, if 
not medically, successful. However, in the space we have available we will not be able to do 
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justice to the large, detailed, and growing amount of evidence that is available on CAM use. Nor 
can we introduce the field of social studies of CAM use, which has been well summarized 
elsewhere (e.g. Kelner et al., 2000).4 Instead we seek to outline a series of the more established 
arguments using the relevant evidence from our meta-study of social science and CAM literature, 
to help focus on reconceptualizing the problems that the above commentators have posed. As 
Paterson et al. (2001) have argued it is possible to carry out a “meta-study” of qualitative health 
research as a “means of building generalizable knowledge from bodies of individual qualitative 
research reports on particular phenomena” (p.2). In contrast to meta-analyses of clinical trials, we 
have not developed systematized inclusion criteria for our reading. Rather we have pooled our 
respective knowledge of the social science and CAM field to synthesize the findings of those 
studies that have specifically included engagement with the users of CAM through interviews, 
ethnographic participation or focus groups. 
Any attempt to understand CAM on a general level is fraught with difficulties, caveats 
and exceptions. As O’Connor (2000) described, many CAMs draw on a specific philosophy and 
understanding – meaning that many similar sounding concepts are not comparable across their 
contextualized states. Similarly, she found that the intra-related and mutually generative nature of 
some concepts within a particular CAM made them extremely difficult to separate out and define 
singularly. When possible, we argue, these problems should be highlighted not as negative 
attributes, but as part of the empirical reality that is central to any developed understanding of 
CAM use. Likewise, Broom and Tovey (2008) highlighted how unquestioned categorizations of 
Western, orthodox or modern medicine is also problematic because of the a priori geopolitical 
and ideological distinctions inherent in such terms. Although in this article we prefer the term 
biomedicine, because it better situates the ideas and practices under consideration (Broom & 
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Tovey, 2008), the complex problems in understanding biomedicine are again issues that need to 
be in the foreground in any analysis. 
Push and Pull 
When exploring the evidence for why people use CAM we argue that it is unhelpful to polarize 
the debate so that use of CAM automatically generates a negative (or positive) response. Rather, 
it is more helpful to understand when, why and how CAM is used. In doing so we can come to 
understand the user of CAM as situated within a multitude of push and pull forces, none of which 
can be said to be explanatory in general, although they might be causally significant for specific 
instances. 
CAM use has been related to negative experiences or iatrogenic effects of biomedicine. 
Patients often report that their experiences of illness are secondary to the clinician’s 
measurements and models of disease and the body (McClean, 2005). The origins of 
dissatisfaction with biomedical treatments can range from poor doctor-patient relationships, 
perceived or actual ineffectiveness of treatments (particularly in many chronic illnesses), through 
to negative or harmful reactions to treatment (Corner et al., 2009). 
There is also evidence to suggest that the effect of the rise of CAM is not necessarily a 
direct challenge to the biomedical establishment. Different CAM models and their rationales 
provide varying degrees of contrast to that of biomedicine, whereas the biomedical establishment 
has shown some capacity to incorporate a number of complementary practices, particularly when 
a CAM regulatory body has shown willingness to utilize RCTs to test their claims (Saks, 2000).  
This hybridization is reflected in patient’s attitudes toward, and use of, CAM. For 
example, Thomas et al. (1991) found that the majority of patients (64%) had received biomedical 
care for the illness they took to the CAM practitioner. Just under a quarter of those continued to 
do so at the same time as seeing the CAM practitioner, with the other 36% not receiving any 
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treatment from their biomedical practitioner (usually their GP). Therefore, more than twenty 
years ago, Thomas et al. rejected the view that patients attending CAM therapists did not 
appreciate or understand the benefit of biomedicine or that the popularity of CAM represents a 
flight from science. In summary, they found that CAM was used as a supplement rather than a 
substitute for biomedical care – a finding that Furnham and Vincent (2000) found replicated in 
many studies since.  
In this personalizing hybridization of treatments Lewith and Chan (2002) found that 
people used very similar criteria to evaluate CAM and biomedicines, which contextualize 
efficacy within other concerns such as time, side effects and cost. They also noted that the user’s 
choice of treatment was based largely on the type of illness they were suffering from, with those 
suffering from chronic illness more likely to engage CAM. In summary, the evidence showed 
patients were not wholly skeptical of biomedicine and blindly accepting of CAM (Britten, 2008; 
Broom & Tovey, 2008). 
Another push or pull factor is that patients look to distinguish between treatments and 
practitioners who empower or disempower (Sharma, 1994). Empowering strategies of control 
have been identified as part of ways of coping with illness (Honda & Jacobson, 2005). 
Furthermore, user’s talk of control and empowerment were seen to easily tap into wider policy 
narratives of patient choice. For example, Leiser (2003), in his study of patterns of belief among 
users of CAM, concluded that support for CAM was “characteristic of patients with a self-aware 
lifestyle and a more active approach to managing their problems” (p.461). Foote-Ardah (2003) 
also suggested that using CAM was “a matter of self-regulation of treatment regimens aimed to 
manage everyday life by increasing personal control” (p.482).  
Many clinicians have therefore considered user’s engagement with CAM as part of the 
patient’s desire to establish control over their illness and body and as part of managing the 
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uncertainty that many diagnoses bring (Broom & Adams, 2009). To this extent biomedical 
practitioners, like Baum (discussed above), have incorporated some CAM as part of a 
psychological support repertoire for patients, a role for CAM that is found to have some basis in 
evidence. However, as Broom and Adams (2009) described, there remains a divergence between 
the biomedical practitioner’s and user’s perspective concerning CAM use.  
The evidence suggests that it is not as simple as biomedicine just making space for CAM 
practices. O’Connor (2000) argued that the attempts by biomedicine to welcome CAM via RCTs 
and the evidence based medicine agenda fail to understand that the integrative approach is based 
on a flawed assumption: That as the project progresses, those CAMs that work will be 
incorporated and those that do not will be shown to be ineffectual and therefore lose favor and 
popularity. O’Connor reasoned that the ongoing use of CAM treatments, in the face of the great 
advances of biomedicine, strongly suggested that this assumption is false. She went on to argue 
that this is not because it is the material (biological) efficacy of CAM that is so attractive, but the 
robustness of their,  
popular epistemologies and ontologies that diverge from the scientific worldview; their 
profound connections to personally and collectively convincing and meaningful 
experiences of the body, of health, of illness, and of healing; and the extent to which 
complementary medical systems incorporate and address these issues. (p.57).  
 
That is to say, its symbolic rather than material efficacy (see Wahlberg, 2008). O’Connor 
concluded that it was of uppermost importance to remember that understanding CAM use has 
therefore to take into account the issues and experiences of those using CAM “as they themselves 
define them” (p.57, emphasis in the original). In summary, the social scientific literature shows 
that people want to understand the meaning of illness, as much as they want to be cured (Britten, 
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2008), and when biomedicine cannot or fails to assist them in this endeavor, they will look 
elsewhere using their body as a testing ground for meaning. 
Embodied users 
A common emphasis in CAM use is its holistic approach to the person; but what does this mean 
and what does it tell us about CAM use?  Given what we have already discussed, understanding 
the contemporary patient necessitates a different framework of consideration than just what is 
available in the biomedical understanding of the body. As Fraser and Greco (2005) summarized, 
there has been a considerable shift in the postwar years in how the body is understood, and not 
just by biomedicine. It is impossible to do justice in a few lines to the shifts that have taken place, 
but they described the move to postindustrial society and the (perceived) concomitant increases in 
both wealth and leisure time for large portions of society. Fraser and Greco also highlighted how 
the body came to the foreground in political liberation movements, such as feminism, antiracism 
and ableism movements, many of which contain an anti-positivist element. The result of these 
cultural shifts is that the body is no longer – if it ever was – a single domain of science and 
medicine. The evidence and rhetoric from many CAM users and providers is that CAM is better 
able and better predisposed to serve these new needs of the body (e.g. Broom & Tovey, 2008). 
As the quote from Ernst (above) shows, perceptions of CAM use can be highly gendered. 
This could be seen simply as an acknowledgment of the main demographic characteristic of 
CAM users (Bishop & Lewith, 2010). However, many social scientists have pointed to the 
dualism that exists in biomedicine, extending de Beauvoir’s (1949/2009) observation that women 
are the Other to the male normal to show how women’s experiences and knowledge of their 
bodies are excluded from biomedical discourses. In response, some have argued that use of CAM 
allows women to address this deficit by empowering a subjective experience that includes wider 
social and environmental issues related to health care (Scott, 1998). CAM has also been found to 
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relate embodied experiences of healing and wellbeing that go beyond physiological concerns to 
connect to wider social and cultural perceptions of body images (Sointu, 2006a). Of course, 
CAM is not without its own problems in identity and cultural formation (Stacey, 1997; 
Sointu, 2006b, 2011; Nissen, 2012); but the point we wish to make here is that reasons for CAM 
use are embodied within a sociocultural milieu that, in turn, affects how we perceive users of 
CAM.  
The user of CAM is better understood as seeking to go beyond (rather than reject) the 
materiality of the biomedical body, which is seen as too limited to encapsulate the many aspects 
of human existence and experiences (Sointu, 2006b). These immaterial considerations can 
include intelligence, the mind, the soul or spirit, a person’s psyche (metaphysical as well as 
neurological), a vital force and/or energy (O’Connor, 2000). Biomedicine’s authoritative claims 
about the nature of illness and disease are therefore challenged (McClean, 2005). As O’Connor, 
(2000) argued this was because, first, it restricted what was valid knowledge to that which had 
been generated via certain controlled methods, by certain professional people. Second, she 
observed that biomedical system’s validity does not always resonate with laypeople’s own 
experiences and observations, which are increasingly felt to be the best sources for authoritative 
knowledge in contexts where professional knowledge is neither available nor wanted.  
Although biomedicine resists or rejects such idiosyncratic claims, CAM is more open to 
such lay empirical based knowledge. O’Connor (2000) found that when CAM users brought 
personal experience together with knowledge of one’s body it generated a “practical 
epistemology” (p.54), whereby one’s own judgments were the basis of efficacy of a treatment or 
experience. However this is not a move to solipsistic irrationality, because even when other 
(biomedical) treatments have failed, users of CAM will still use scientific logic and reasoning as 
  16
part of their empirical self-testing of CAM on oneself (Hök et al., 2007). Again, the importance 
of how CAM is actually used finds us located in a multidisciplinary middle ground. 
It is this complex picture to which social science has attended. It is not possible, as Broom 
and Tovey (2007) have argued, to reduce the complexity of what is happening down to some 
simple argument or perceived social trend, such as postmodernism, which has been found to hold 
little explanatory power in practice. As a conceptual minimum Broom and Tovey argued that 
CAM use can be understood within the “depersonalization” that comes with advances in 
bioscience and medicine and the wider social process of “individualization” that locates the 
individual as the moral site of autonomy. However both of these terms contain a complexity that 
needs to be understood within the site of CAM itself. They are not a priori explanations, but 
indicators of what to look for when one attends to the field of CAM use. They also need to be 
located, Broom and Tovey (2007) argued, within the demographic and physiological confines of 
each person’s illness. 
For this reason a lot of CAM research attends to users’ stories and narratives within them. 
This is because, Frank (1995) reasoned, people’s stories of their lives figure prominently in the 
ways we seek to understand experiences of illness. Frank found that those who were previously 
the subject of stories, such as those from biomedicine, now fashioned their own accounts to 
“speak her own truth, in her own words” (p. xiii). Listening to these voices demands a different 
set of analytical tools and a respect for what those tools can show us.  
For an example of the important difference recognizing stories and the narratives within 
them makes, let us address the problem of the reformulation of medical and scientific categories 
and consider the consequent implications on the individual’s identity. As Mathieson and 
Stam (1995) stated “medical talk becomes part of an illness narrative to the extent that it fits the 
renegotiation of identity. Words such as ‘cancer,’ ‘tumor,’ ‘chemotherapy’ and the like have 
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meaning only to the extent that they form part of the patient’s ongoing identity work” (p.302). A 
patient will first learn about their disease and the nature of medical discourse around it and then 
decide how they fit into that discourse. “It is at once a participation in the global cancer narrative 
and idiosyncratic because patients must learn a cancer vocabulary in order to articulate their 
concerns” (p.298, emphasis in the original). In working on their own accounts of their bodies 
people will draw on the cultural reference points available to them. One source of these is CAM. 
Critiques of CAM use would point out that CAM only serves to complicate matters, 
in particular around biomedicine’s precise scientific terminology, much to the detriment of the 
patient (Baum, 2009; Dawkins, 2007a; Goldacre, 2008). Putting to one side the philosophical 
linguistic problems of this position, it is an argument that returns medicine to the position of 
paternalistic authority figure. As Charles et al. (1998) found, the model used is one where the 
patient is someone to whom the doctor can impart the necessary knowledge and who will absorb 
and utilize the information as a rational actor. In this way the evidence based model for doctors is 
equated with a rational decision making patient. Hence, if the patient deviates from the scientific 
evidence they are labeled as irrational and it is the duty of the physician to protect them. However, 
as Charles et al. argued, in this model “[p]aternalism comes a full circle. This model leaves no 
active role for the patient in interpreting the scientific information or in trying to make it 
personally meaningful” (p.88).  
Alternatively, narrative based research has found that CAM does allow users to increase 
control of their illness and attempt to normalize their health status. CAM was found to do this by 
providing individualized ways of managing symptoms, medications and emotions, through self-
exploration and providing complementary and alternative frameworks of understanding and 
meaning (O’Connor, 2002). Indeed, Sharma (1992) has argued that CAM provided individuals 
with, 
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 a new way of looking at their illnesses, that sense of a more relevant order being imposed 
on problematic experiences [and]. . . . insofar as this new interpretation is found 
acceptable and creates positive feelings of comfort and confidence on the part of the 
patient, then there is a sense in which it has “worked”. (p. 72) 
 
Central to much of this is the reevaluation of the relationship between the mind and the 
body. The idea, or caricature, of the Cartesian-self posits that in the seventeenth century 
René Descartes separated the mind, which became the preserve of religion and moral philosophy, 
from the body, which was handed to the scientists and doctors (Harrington, 2008). Regardless of 
the factual accuracy of this depiction, it is a narrative that now permeates both CAM (e.g. 
McClean, 2006) and biomedical understandings of the person (e.g. Greco, 1998). For CAM users 
the mind body problem is often referred to as part of the psychosomatic component to illness or, 
borrowing from a burgeoning bioscience, as the psychoneuroimmunological aspect of illness 
(Harrington, 2008). CAM use therefore allows the user to relate their physical experience of 
illness to the many intangible aspects of their life. At the same time, it brings hope that working 
on the bio-neuro-chemical pathways might alleviate the physical presence of many (iatrogenic) 
symptoms, if not the illness itself. 
What we have begun to outline here is the importance of subjective understandings of the 
body and mind in formations of the self for people who use CAM. We find that people bring 
together multiple ways of knowing and experiencing to contemplate their situation and to make 
sense of what is happening. In particular in illness, perhaps more than any other time in life, 
people become acutely aware of their embodied constraints. However, through the stories they 
tell to themselves and others they are able to emplot new pasts, presents and futures. People also 
become more aware of their relations to others, drawing on their affective responses as a measure 
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and predictor of their circumstances. Within this, the categories and discourses of biomedicine 
and CAM (among others) become resources on which to draw to form and reform oneself, health 
and life. 
The problem of patient choice 
Social science research on CAM use has repeatedly shown that insisting on a clear separation of 
CAM from biomedicine simply does not bear up to empirical scrutiny, whether on the part of 
patients or practitioners (McClean, 2006; Johannessen & Lazar, 2005). Individuals are 
notoriously unfaithful to any one particular form of therapy, electing instead to try different 
options or combinations until they find something that works for them (Britten, 2008; O'Connor, 
1995). 
This brings us to the problem of patient choice, i.e. the notion that patients are the experts 
(of their lives) and thereby in the best position to know which therapy or treatment approach is 
best for them. There is an important social scientific literature on patient choice in the context of 
biomedical practice, which we cannot cover within the scope of this article. What we will discuss 
instead is how social scientific research on CAM use weighs in on the problem of patient choice. 
Patient choice can be understood in the context of what Janzen (1978) has called a “quest 
for therapy” (p.37) and Augé (1985) “therapeutic itineraries”, namely “the routes taken by people 
who wish to be cured of an illness or malaise” (p.12). Although the figure of the CAM consumer 
who “shops around” has also been invoked (Cant & Sharma, 1999, p.37), it is more helpful to 
think in terms of routes and itineraries, because these encompass more than commercial 
transactions and can include such things as lay referral networks, information gathering activities 
and processes of socialization. Peglidou (2010) has shown how “in the open-ended process of 
therapeutic trajectories . . . different and heterogeneous healing practices often alternate, each 
employing a variety of concepts of the body, soul, sickness and healing” (p.51).  
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 What the notion of routes therefore helps to contextualize is the point that choices are 
rarely made in isolation but rather in the context of what Sleeboom-Faulkner (2010) has called 
“frameworks of choice” – “choices are a product of circumstances and structural factors, which 
delimit and condition the choices individuals, families and communities make” (p.13). In the 
context of healing, choice relates to opting for, pursuing and tacking between certain courses of 
action. What the qualitative studies considered here have shown is that such decisions are 
reasoned through, discussed and lay researched by individuals along the way, at the same time as 
being subject to the normalizing discourses of rational or appropriate use of various forms of 
medicines (Johannessen & Lazar, 2005). The point being that, in matters of choice, it is a 
“patient’s authoritative agency” (O’Connor, 1995, p.162) – however socially conditioned, 
structurated or habitus infused – which is in focus. It is also this active patient that somehow 
contrasts to the passive recipient of evidence based medicine. 
Conclusion 
Having reviewed social science findings regarding the use of CAM, the figure of the duped, 
ignorant, irrational or immoral CAM user seems somehow distant and faded. Instead we have 
met individuals following socially mediated therapeutic itineraries, actively reflecting on and 
reasoning about their actions, embracing certain narrative accounts, and rejecting others. These 
are the kinds of findings that emerge when CAM users are consulted – in a systematized, 
rigorous and reflective manner – as a way to account for their CAM use. 
One can already imagine a likely response from those vocal commentators with whom we 
began this article: What you have summarized here only confirms what we suggest, CAM users 
are ignorant at best and deluded at worst regardless of how they ended up as CAM users. Perhaps 
even worse than that, by making sense of their actions social scientists are in fact legitimizing 
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dangerous therapeutic practices. Again, Ernst and Chatwin’s (2005) debate posed important 
questions: 
Could sociological CAM research do any harm? I fear the answer might be yes. It tends to 
describe phenomena such as CAM’s growing popularity and acceptance, patients’ reasons 
for using CAM, patients’ satisfaction, etc. The interpretations that are then put on the 
findings (by sociologists and others) lend themselves to some type of legitimisation or 
justification, often even promotion, of CAM . . . the research agenda of sociologists often 
tacitly assumes the efficacy and safety of CAM. Since these assumptions are often not 
met, the results of such investigations are prone to mislead. (p.17) 
 
However, accounting for CAM use, of course, tells us nothing about whether or not CAM 
should or should not be used in a particular context. Although one might be tempted to read this 
article as a dismissal of evidence based medicine, this is far from being the case. To put it simply, 
if one is interested in accounting for CAM use then clinical trials, assays, toxicology tests are not 
your best bet. Likewise, if you are interested in the (lacking) biological mechanisms-of-action of 
a given therapy, semi-structured interviews, fieldwork and participant observation are not suitable. 
What we have suggested in this article is those analyses that look on the user of CAM as 
duped, ignorant, deluded or immoral are simply not helpful – from an analytical, pragmatic, 
public health, or other perspective. This does not mean that important questions around the safety 
of CAM (or any other kind of therapy for that matter) should not be addressed. Indeed, the group 
of commentators we have engaged with in this article have been at the forefront of calling for 
robust attention to patient safety. However, as we have shown, the problem of CAM use cannot 
be resolved through generalized assumptions about the user based on laboratory or clinical 
practices alone. 
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Notes 
1. See Wahlberg (2007) for an analysis of how the problem of ‘CAM practice’ has come to be 
cast in the United Kingdom in recent years. 
2. There is a large debate concerning whether or not there has in fact been growing interest or 
rising use of CAM in the last decades in the United Kingdom (see McClean, 2006; Moore & 
McClean, 2010). In this article, we are not so much interested in whether or not CAM use is on 
the rise, but rather about how a rising use of CAM is considered a problem. 
3. One could also focus on reports and guidelines from the National Health Service and 
Department of Health, or on advice from CAM practitioners about the appropriate/inappropriate 
use of various forms of CAM therapy. 
4. We have not always cited the most recent evidence to substantiate our arguments because we 
wished to avoid, where possible, using evidence that was not available to those who have 
critiqued users of CAM at the time they published their analyses. 
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